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Larimore: The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the

NOTES
THE ECONOMIC REALITIES OF DEFINING NOTES AS

SECURITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 19341"
INTRODUCTON

Congress sought to harmonize securities regulation under one cogent system
of disclosure and control' by enacting the Securities Act of 19332 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.3 The Securities Act, which has been
characterized as a disclosure statute,4 primarily regulates public offerings of
securities by issuers and sellers.5 The Exchange Act deals principally with
trading on the securities markets" by protecting purchasers as well as sellers
from fraud 7 through continuous disclosure requirements.8 The statutes work
8

Editors' Note. This note was the co-winner of the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice
Prize for the best student note submitted in the spring 1982 semester.
1. See H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. 'WING, SEcuRrns LAw § 2.01 (1973).
2. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §§ 1-27, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1976)).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, §§ 1-35, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976)).
4. Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure:
SEC and FTC Requirements, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. Summer 1977, at 30.
5. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). As originally drafted, the
Securities Act provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which

they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the

purchaser.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. Section 2 of the Exchange Act clearly sets out the act's objectives. This preamble
to the Exchange Act, entitled "Necessity for regulation," depicts the legislation as intent
upon perfecting a national market system of securities conducted on securities exchanges.
The section goes on to note that manipulation of securities prices on the exchange has
an adverse affect on the national economy and interstate commerce. Securities transactions
and exchanges, therefore, need regulation. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78b(l)-(4) (1976).
The anomaly is that the Exchange Act's regulatory effects have been extended far
beyond securities exchanges to include almost all aspects of the securities field. The broad
grant of power to the SEC in § l0b of the act has resulted in the prohibition of deceptive
practices in virtually all securities transactions. See infra notes 8 & 59.
7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The Act
provides:
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independently to compel disclosure that enables investors to make intelligent
investment decisions o and promotes overall truth in securities dealings.'1
While the securities acts' 2 have been described as skillful illustrations of
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange- (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
-or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. Although the Securities Act was intended to be the major cornerstone of disclosure
policies in the securities field, amendments to the Exchange Act have turned it into the
more demanding of the two acts. Benston, supra note 4, at 30. The major disclosures required
by the 1964 Amendments are initial registration, current reports, proxy solicitation material
and insider ownership reports. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n, 78p
(1976). See generally Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1340, 1355-63
(1966).
9. The securities laws have long been seen as distinct parts of a larger regulatory
scheme. While their objectives, disclosure to investors, are identical, they utilize different
methods of achieving that end. The Securities Act is seen as transaction oriented, because it
focuses on a company's public securities offerings. The Exchange Act, in contrast, focuses
upon the issuers of securities that are listed and traded on a stock exchange. The result is
that many of the disclosure procedures are duplicative and expensive. In response to this
problem, the SEC has instituted a policy of integration. The objective of this policy is to
coordinate the disclosure requirements of the two acts so as to minimize waste and to
reduce reporting burdens. See generally Greene, Integration of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act: A Case Study of Regulation in the Division of Corporation Finance of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, a J. Comp. CoRP. L. & Sa REG. 75, 76-78
(1981).
10. The statutes also aimed to provide shareholders with information to allow effective
exercise of their rights. In doing so, Congress chose to avoid any form of federal chartering
or direct control of corporate conduct, an area traditionally viewed as a state concern. Sommer,
The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance, LAw & CONTEMP. PRoas., Summer 1977,
at 115,118; see generally Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus.
L~w. 4125, 1126-28 (1975) (historical account of federal chartering proposals).
11. This principle of disclosure is embodied in the statement by Justice Brandeis that,
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; the electric light the most efficient of
policemen." L. BRANDEIS, OTOM PEOPWL'S MONEY 62 (1933), quoted in Benston, supra note 4,
at 30. Although this metaphor is often used, it serves to expose the two-fold benefits of disclosure. Obviously disclosure allows the investor to intelligently invest; it also encourages the
securities issuer to properly behave. The disclosure statutes encourage voluntary compliance
with their provisions to deter improper practices. Sommer, supra note 10, at 119.
12. The term securities acts or laws, for the purposes of this note, encompasses only the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although there are five
federal securities acts, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are the major regulatory
provisions. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, § 301, 53 Stat. 1149 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § § 77aaa-bbb (1976)), requires publicly offered debt securities to be issued in
conjunction with an independent trustee. The Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686,
§ 1, 54 Stat. 789 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a(l)-(64) (1976)), imposes certain registration and operation requirements on investment companies. The Investment Advisors Act
of 1940, ch. 686, § 201, 54 Stat. 847 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80b(I)-(21) (1976)),
regulates investment advisors whose business includes fifteen or more clients and is not
solely intrastate.
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draftmanship, 13 defining which transactions are securities subject to the acts
has become a controversial issue.' 4 In regard to note transactions, 15 both acts
define securities so broadly virtually any note falls within the purview of
securities regulation."" Where note transactions are concerned, courts have
therefore been forced to determine whether the statutory definition of a
note security should be narrowed. Seeking to avoid the practical problems
involved in subjecting all notes to securities regulation, 17 the federal courts
13. See H. BLOOMENrHAL & S. WInG, supra note 1, § 2.01 ("The technical skill is reflected in an economy of words achieved by the closely knit relationship of central provisions woven together by a few key definitions.').
14.

See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful

Formula?,18 W. Rrs. L. REv. 367, 368-69 (1967); Lipton & Katz, Notes Are (Are Not?) Always
Securities- A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861, 866 (1974).
15. A note, or promissory note as it is also known, usually signifies a written instrument whereby the maker promises to pay a designated sum to a named payee. These instruments may encompass a wide variety of transactions, including loan agreements, sales transactions or mortgage arrangements. For attempts to define a note, see Developers Small
Business Inv. Corp. v. Hoeckle, 395 F.2d 80, 85 n.d (9th Cir. 1968) ("note" refers to written
obligation to pay money without reference to security of a mortgage, which may be negotiable); Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 2-11 Pa. Super. 87, 91, 286 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)
(note is irrevocable promise by maker to pay); U.C.C. § 3-104(1) & (2) (1978) (instrument
containing express promise by signer to pay specified person definite sum at specified time).
16. The Securities Act defines a security:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires - (1) The term
"security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a security:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires- (10) The term
"security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral
royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization, certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security";
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing; but
shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
For a discussion of the exclusion of short-term notes from the Securities Act definition
of a note, see infra notes 112-40 and accompanying text.
17. Federal courts have been inundated in recent years with expanding securities litigation. As noted in Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970): "In recent years, ...
one can scarcely find an issue of the advance sheets of the Federal Supplement and Federal
Reporter that does not contain an opinion on § 10(b) [the fraud provision of the Ex-
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have developed comprehensive tests more narrowly defining note securities. 8
Most courts and commentators agree that some notes, such
as those executed
to secure a home mortgage, are definitely not subject to securities regulation 9
Conversely, other note transactions, such as those notes a corporation issues
to acquire capital, are undoubtedly securities. 2 0 The difficult task has been to
develop a practical test for determining the status of notes falling between
these extremes.2 ' Because the securities acts were enacted to protect investors,
the prevailing judicial trend has been to examine ,the economic realities of
note transactions for signs of investor involvement. 22 Although the Supreme
Court declined to address the issue of note securities,23 evolving tests pay homage to the Court's recent trend of narrowing the general scope of the securi24
ties laws.
This note examines the tests currently in use for determining which note
change Act]." Concerns are being expressed as to the ability of federal courts to handle
this expanding case load. Due to the wide range of activities that can involve notes, this
is a valid, consideration when determining the breadth with which securities are to be
defined. See Comment, The Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1975 Ajuz. ST. L.J. 175, 183. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1980, at A13, col. 1 (year-end

report by Chief Justice Burger, stating that burgeoning case loads are one of the major
problems facing the federal judiciary).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 56-111. The federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
have different tests for defining a note security, but they all agree some notes are not
securities despite statutory language to the contrary.
19. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 644 F.2d 1126,
1188 (2d Cir. 1976); (fraud provisions of Exchange Act obviously do not apply to notes
home mortgages secure); Comment, supra note 17, at 175 (real estate mortgages in exchange
for promissory notes should not be securities under securities acts).
20. See, e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978) (notes given in
exchange for capital to be used in import venture); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkley Photo, Inc.,
452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (corporation issues note to second corporation for purchase
of assets); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (note received for
loan of seed capital in venture capital deal).
21. Attempts to fashion a workable definition of note securities have been analogized
to Justice Stewart's now-famous concurrence in the pornography case of Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964). Justice Stewart observed:
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture in this case is not that.
Id. at 197. See Forester, Rule 10b-5 Violations in the Ninth Circuit: "I Know It When I See
It', 30 Bus. LAw. 773, 773 (1975) (difficulty in defining degree of scienter required under
rule lOb-5 results in imprecise standard); Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene
Security, A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TEen L. Rav. 25, 26 (1975)
(current judicial tests defining note securities are arbitrary and unworkable).
22. See infra notes 39-111 and accompanying text.
23. E.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981);
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 US. 825 (1975); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973).
24. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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transactions are securities in light of legislative history and the statutory
definitions of a note security. By addressing special problems associated with
one particular type of note transaction, the corporate note transaction, 25
deficiencies in the current definitional schemes are exposed. The failure of
these tests to accommodate problems in the areas of commercial paper, financial
institutions and corporate governance will be analyzed. This note concludes
by offering an alternative version of the economic realities test that would
address these problems by presuming securities law coverage of corporate
note transactions.
STATUTORY DEFnlInONS AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF NoTE SECURITIES

The Securities Act and the Exchange Act define a security in virtually
identical terms926 as "any note.., or... any instrument commonly known
as a 'security.' "27 Prefatory language, however, qualifies this explicit pronouncement by providing wide latitude to deviate from the proffered definition of securities where "the context otherwise requires."28s This ambiguous
introductory language leaves unclear whether a note's status should be determined from the context of the economic transaction in which it occurs or
from the use of the term security in the text of the statutes. 29 The particular
25. When used in this note, the term corporate note connotates a transaction in which
either, or both, the issuer and issuee of a note is a corporation. Although the transactions
may vary greatly in form and economic circumstances, they share the common thread of
corporate involvement. One commentator has suggested note transactions can be divided
into four major categories: notes issued in business loans from institutions, notes issued in
purchase transactions, notes issued between a corporation and related parties, and notes
issued to outside purchasers. See Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note
Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAw. 1567, 1579-87 (1980). Corporate notes
comprise a broader class that is present in varying degrees in all of these categories. This
note's position is that corporate notes merit separate consideration under the securities acts
as an identifiable class of transactions.
26. For the text of the statutory definitions, see supra note 16. The definitions in the
two acts differ in three respects: (1) the Securities Act definition includes an "evidence of
indebtedness," (2) the Exchange Act definition excludes short-term notes, and (3) the acts
classify oil and gas interests differently. See H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, supra note I, § 2.02.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) & 78c(aXIO) (1976).
28. Id. §§ 77b & 78c(a).
29. The debated language reads identically in both statutes: "When used in this subchapter [chapter], unless the context otherwise requires--The term 'security' means any
note . . ." I'd. §§ 77b(l) & 78c(a)(10). The Supreme Court has apparently determined the
economic context of a transaction should govern the definition of a security. See infra notes
50-54 and accompanying text. In spite of this fact, the context versus text controversy
continues to rage in legal academic circles. Compare Hammett, supra note 21, at 74
(statutory language is unambiguous and text should be followed) and Comment, Notes as
Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36
MD. L. Rrv. 233, 254 (1976) (proper construction is contextual usage of term in statute)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Notes as Securities] with Comment, supra note 17, at 192
(economic context approach should not be discarded in favor of literal coverage of statute)
and Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 526 (1973) (context of transaction governs text of statute) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Commercial Notes].
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construction given the statutes' prefatory language determines whether all
notes are subject to regulation under the acts, or whether other criteria may
be used to limit statutory coverage to certain classes of notes. Inferences may
be drawn from the legislative history to support either construction,"0 and
Congress has failed to remedy the ambiguity.
The securities acts differ in their definitional treatment of short-term notes.
The Exchange Act excludes short-term notes with a maturity length of nine
months or less from its definition of a security. 3' The Securities Act, although
it exempts short-term notes from registration, 32 makes no reference to short.
term notes in its definition of securites3s Consequently, short-term notes are
not subject to registration under either act and are covered by the fraud
provision of the Securities Act only.34 These statutory differences contradict
legislative history, which demonstrates Congress intended the definition of
securities to be substantially the same in both acts.35
Because the legislative history did not settle the text versus context controversy or explain the inconsistent definitions, courts have been forced to
rely on broader congressional purpose for guidance in defining note securities.38 One theme pervades the history of the consideration of these statutes:
30. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) (technical character of
securities problems prohibits rigidity in administration of the statute), reprinted in 5
LEGsLqATIV

HISTORY OF THE SEcuaiTms

Acr or

1933

AN)

SEcuRmES

Acr

oF

1934 6-7 (Ellen-

berger & Mahar 1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATVE HisroRa]; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934) (definitions of securities are sell-explanatory), reprinted in 5
Lxcx stm' HwroR, supra at 17; H.R. RP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933) (prima
facie requirement that every security and transaction not specifically exempted is within
statutes' scope), reprinted in 2 IsLATIVE HisronY, supra at 6-7.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(I0) (1976). See supra note 16.
32. 15 US.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976). The relevant provision provides:
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities: (3) Any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a current transaction or the
proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, and which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days
of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id.
33. Id. § 77b(1). See supra note 16.
34. Despite this literal difference in statutory treatment, most courts define note securities
identically under both acts. See infra note 126. It should be observed that the short-term
exemption of the Exchange Act omits the current transaction language of the Securities Act
exemption. For a discussion of the implications of this difference, see infra notes 128-26 &
192-95.
35. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) (definitions of issuer and security
are substantially the same in both acts), reprinted in 5 LsAXrvE HISTORY, supra note 0,
as Item 17, at 14.
36. A brief recitation of the country's economic situation preceding the passage of the
securities acts provides powerful insight into Congress' purpose in enacting these legislative
remedies. The securities acts were passed in the midst of the Great Depression. During
the post-World War I period, over 50 billion new securities had been issued, half of which
proved entirely worthless. The valueless securities were viewed as the result of unscrupulous
dealings by dealers and underwriters who overstimulated demand for securities. This created
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the protection of investors. 37 Despite advice that the definition of securities
included some commercial instruments, 3 concern for investor interests compelled Congress to pass the securities laws. Given the ambiguity of statutory
definitions and the availability of legislative history to support both sides of
the text/context controversy, investor protection has become the major focal
point in defining securities.
JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SECURiTIES

Prior to 1971, federal courts uniformly construed all notes to be securities
within the meaning of the securities acts. 39 Increased judicial strain prompted
by expanding securities litigation, however, has recently weakened absolute
adherence to plain statutory language. 40 To reduce this burden the Supreme
unnecessary corporate expansion, undertaken at the insistence of the dealers, solely to
satisfy an artificially created market. The result was the stock market crash of 1929 and an
economic depression of cataclysmic proportions. Misleading disclosure resulting in unwise
investment was seen as the major cause of the market failure. While economists might
challenge this explanation, this clearly was the view presented to Congress when the acts
were passed. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE
HiSToRy, supra note 30, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933), reprinted in
2 LaGsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at 2-3.
37. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934) (federal legislation necessary
to curb speculation harmful to investors), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISroRY, supra note 30,
at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (bill seeks to regulate public investment and thereby eliminate destructive speculation), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY,
supra note 30, at 2; S. REP. No. 41, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (basic policy of informing
investor of facts concerning securities), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 30, at
1-2; President's Message Transmitting a Recommendation to Congress for Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce, H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (purpose of legislation is protection of investors with least possible
interference to honest business), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY, supra note 30, at 1-2.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (definition of security in Securities Act sufficiently broad to include "the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security'), reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 30, at 11.
39. See, e.g., Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953) (promissory notes
given in exchange for funds to be bet on "fixed" volleyball game), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923
(1954); Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (issuance of notes to plaintiff for
loans to fund defendants' expedition to retrieve "hidden monies"); Corp. v. Newman, 276 F.
Supp. 646 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (personal note issued by individual on behalf of one corporation to
second corporation); Whitlow & Assoc., Ltd. v. Intermountain Brokers, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 943
(D. Hawaii 1966) (note given as deposit on loan application defendant's broker was to arrange); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (notes in exchange for loans to
finance defendants' mining operations); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958)
(note issued by defendant corporation to plaintiff stockholders), aj'd, 283 F.2d 304 (1960)
(per curiam).
40. Restrictive application of the securities acts appears to be a backlash in response
to lower federal courts' increased receptiveness to securities claims. Liberal construction
of the securities laws provided prospective plaintiffs with numerous advantages over state
or common law remedies. For a comprehensive account of this liberalization process, see
Note, Action Under State Law: Florida's Blue Sky and Common Law Alternatives to Rule
10b-5 for Relief in Securities Fraud, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 636, 638-47 (1980). While the
Supreme Court has recently sought to restrict the scope of the securities laws, other ad-
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Court has adopted less expansive interpretations of the acts in other contexts.4
Most courts presently look to the context of the note transaction, rather
than the text of the statute, to define the extent of securities coverage. The
United States Supreme Court adopted this approach in Tcherepnin v. Knight.42

The plaintiffs in Tcherepnin alleged fraud in connection with a savings and
loan association's sale's of withdrawable capital shares." The Court decided
the narrow issue of federal jurisdiction" only and found the capital shares
vantages to a federal cause of action still exist. For example, both acts provide for worldwide service of process. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v & 78aa (1976). Additionally, the venue provisions
are very broad, allowing an action to be brought in any district in which the defendant is
found. Id. § 77v (also in districts where offer or sale of securities occurred, if defendant
participated in the transaction); id. § 78aa (includes any district in which any act in
furtherance of the fraud was committed by any defendant). See generally H. BLOOMENTHAM,
1981 &ScunrrmsLAw HANDBOOK § 25.01 (1981).
41. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1115 (1980) (imposing no duty
of disclosure on purchaser, absent fiduciary duty to seller); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 45-46 (limiting relief under Exchange Act for defeated tender offerors); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977) (narrowing application of rule lob-5
to corporate controllers who breach fiduciary duty); Ernst 8- Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
193 (1976) (imposing scienter requirement for rule 10b-5 recovery); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (limiting standing to sue under rule lOb-5

to actual purchasers of securities).
42. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Tcherepnin was the Court's first opportunity to interpret the
definitional section of the Exchange Act. Earlier examinations of the Securities Act's definition of security, however, aided the Court. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., a28 U.S. 293 (1946)
involved the definition of a securities investment contract under the Securities Act. The
defendant had offered to sell portions of a citrus grove coupled with contracts to cultivate,
market and return the proceeds to prospective investors. Id. at 295. Although the contracts
were optional, the Court deemed them securities. Id. at 300. The Howey test for defining
an investment contract was whether the scheme entailed an investment of money in a common
enterprise with the proceeds to come solely from another's efforts. Id. at 301. While the
Tcherepnin Court borrowed heavily from this test in defining an investment contract, other
decisions also provided background for the decisions. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.

Co., 387 US. 202, 211-12 (1967) (deferred annuity contract was investment contract under
1933 Act); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71-73 (1959) (annuity
contracts were securities); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-54 (1943)
(assignments of oil leases were securities under the Securities Act).
43. Violations of § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), the fraud provision of the Exchange
Act, were alleged. 389 U.S. at 333. The plaintiffs additionally sought relief under § 29(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), which provides for the rescission of contracts made in violation of
the act. Id. The savings and loan's solicitations failed to disclose the association had been
denied federal insurance on its accounts and that its controlling individual had been

convicted of mail fraud involving savings and loans. Id.at 334.
44.

Capital shares actually represent the capital which a savings and loan member

has on account at the association. Under Illinois law, each one hundred dollars on account
entitled the holder to vote one share. The rate of return was not fixed, as the board of
directors declared dividends distributed from profits. Id. at 333.
45. 389 U.S. at 345. Federal jurisdiction for violations of the securities laws' fraud provisions requires direct or indirect ties with the facilities of interstate commerce. This requirement rarely impedes an action, as courts usually construe the requirement quite
liberally. As one court noted: "That the jurisdiction hook need not be large to fish for
securities laws violations is well established." Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir.
1968) (check crossing state lines to clear bank). See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 728-29
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4
to be securities. A unanimous Court explained that as remedial legislation,4 67
the securities acts should be broadly construed to effectuate their purposes.
Examining the economic realities of the situation, it was apparent the
plaintiffs were completely dependent upon the savings and loan management
for protection of their investment. 48 The Court therefore concluded that when
form was disregarded for substance in defining a security, the petitioners
49
merited securities protection.
Although the economic realities approach originally manifested the Court's
intention to define securities broadly in order to protect investors, the Court
used the test to narrow the definition in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman.50 In Forman, the Supreme Court determined that shares purchased
in a co-operative housing project, were not securities. 52 Relying on the
economic reality language of Tcherepnin, the majority rejected the argument
that the Securities Act was applicable because the interests were termed
stock in the purchase agreement. 53 Thus, for the first time the economic

(9th Cir. 1967) (intrastate phone call used in making misrepresentation), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968). Use of the mails satisfied the requirement in Tcherepnin. 389 U.S. at 833.
46. Remedial legislation provides a method for obtaining relief or redressing wrongs,
as distinguished from affecting a pre-existing right. BLAcK's LAw DicnoNARY 1162-63 (5th
ed. 1979). See supra note 97.
47. 389 U.S. at 336. Broad construction of statutory language in order to effect congressional purpose has been a recurring theme in securities litigation. See, e.g., Reliance
Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 4)4 U.S. 418, 428 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (flexibility required
in interpretation of securities legislation to effect congressional purpose); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (Congress meant for Investment
Advisors Act to be construed like all securities legislation, flexibly to effectuate remedial
purpose of avoiding fraud); SEC; v. W. J. Howey, 28 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (unrealistic
formulae are not to thwart poliq, of affording investors broad protection).
48. 389 U.S. at 338-39. State law regulated the form and structure of control exerted
over the investments in this case. See supra note 44. While state law allocated control over
the withdrawable capital shares, federal law governed whether that form constituted a
security. 389 U.S. at 337-38.
49. 389 US. at 345.
50. 421 US. 837 (1975).
51. Id. at 843. Prospective apartment owners were required to purchase shares in a
corporation formed to own and operate the co-operative's buildings and land. The shares
were strictly tied to ownership, had no voting rights, and in effect were recoverable deposits
on apartments. Id. at 836.
52. Id. at 858-60. The Forman Court formulated the following short-hand test of the
common attributes of securities transactions: (1) the presence of an investment (2) in a
common venture (3) premised upon a reasonable expectation of profits (4) to be derived
from the enterpreneurial or managerial efforts of others. Id.
53. Id. at 848. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the fraud provisions of both securities
acts, arising from misleading information contained in information bulletins soliciting apartment purchasers. Id. at 844. Allegedly, the co-operative represented it would absorb all increased mortgage costs attributable to inflation. Id. When payments were subsequently raised,
the plaintiff apartment owners filed suit derivatively on the corporation's behalf seeking
damages from the co-operative. Id. Rejecting the argument that the shares in question were
securities simply because they were called stock, the Court noted: "Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to
turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not the name appended
thereto." Id. at 848-49.
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realities approach was used to narrow the definition of a security."'
Lower federal courts have since adopted the economic realities test of
Tcherepnin and Forman and abandoned the literal statutory definition of
securities. 5 Three approaches have evolved for determining which note
transactions must be regulated under the securities acts. All of these tests are
generic approaches which fail to distinguish between corporate and noncorporate notes. An analysis of these methods will shed light on the present
status of corporate notes as securities under the federal securities acts. Additionally, the effect of corporate involvement on judging a transaction's economic realities will be considered.
Commercial/InvestmentDichotomy - Presumption
Against Coverage of Notes
The majority of those federal appellate courts which have considered
whether note transactions are securities have adopted some form of the
commercial/investment dichotomy.56 Although the proffered tests possess
distinguishing characteristics, the economic context of the transaction must
54. Ird. at 849. The Court specifically rejected a literal approach for construing the
statute. Id. Abandoning the previous posture of construction to broaden remedies under
the acts, an alternative canon of construction was adopted: "A thing may be within the

letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers." Id. (quoting Church of Holy Trinity'v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). Significantly, a literal construction of the "any stock" language of

the definitional sections would have provided securities coverage of the interests in question.

By analyzing the transaction in terms of the Howey test, however, the majority found the

prospect of acquiring a place to live attracted investors, not the financial returns on their
investments. Using the economic realities test contradicted the original justification for its
adoption: to broaden remedies under the securities acts. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. In spite of this contradiction, the Court has subsequently reaffirmed its use of the

economic realities test to limit the breadth of securities protection. See Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (1982) (bank certificates of deposit are not securities because
federal banking laws adequately protect such issuances, abrogating the need for securities

protection).
55. See infra notes 56-111 and accompanying text. But cf. SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) ("Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a

different coloration in different sections of the securities laws.").
56. The Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits are usually grouped as following some
form of the commercial/investment dichotomy. In addition, the D.C. Circuit has recently
joined this fraternity of investment oriented courts. See Bauer v. The Planning Group, Inc.,
669 F.2d 770, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the Fifth and Seventh formulations,
see infra notes 57-81. While case law and reasoning from the remaining circuits are somewhat sketchy, they clearly attempt to isolate investment characteristics when determining
securities coverage. See McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors,
562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1976); Lino v. City
Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Ripso v. Spring Lake Mews, Inc., 485 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (3d Cir.); Provident Natl Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp.
448 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (3d Cir.). For other decisions which have not addressed the issue of
note transactions directly, but have applied an investment oriented test, see Lawler v.
Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. 1978) (note involved in transaction to fund purported
import venture); SEC v. World Radio Mission, 544 F.2d 535, 538 (1st Cir. 1976) (sale
of "loan plans" which involved notes).
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exhibit investment characteristics for the note to be extended securities status
and protection. Furthermore, investment focused tests seem to carry an inherent bias against securities coverage. The party seeking security coverage
must demonstrate the note's investment nature to be afforded protection
under the securities acts.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a leading advocate of the commercial/
investment dichotomy, first announced its investment test5 7 for notes in Bellah

v. First National Bank of Hereford.58 The plaintiff, Bellah, sought federal
relief from deceptive practices under the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 which
was promulgated thereunder.5 9 Federal jurisdiction was premised upon the
argument that a six-month promissory note plaintiffs obtained to finance a
livestock operation was a security entitled to coverage under the Exchange
Act.60 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the counts
based upon the note for lack of federal jurisdiction' observing that the lack
62
of jurisdiction hinged on an inability to classify the note as investment.

57. Implicit approval of an investment type test was given in the earlier Fifth Circuit
case of United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1973). Rachal involved criminal
convictions for securities fraud and the sale of unregistered securities. Id. at 1340. Affirming
the convictions, the court approved jury instructions that narrowed the short-term note
exemptions under the Securities Act to the criteria of SEC Release 4412. Id. at 1343. See
infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. The appellate court noted that the charges did

not narrow the exemption beyond the congressional intention in adopting it. 473 F.2d at
1343.
58. 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 1110. The Exchange Act's fraud provision expressly grants the SEC power
to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the protection of investors. See supra note
7. Pursuant to this power, SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, lob-5 (19&1) was adopted. The
rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any
act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. For an interesting account of the circumstances surrounding the rule's adoption, see
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
60. 495 F.2d at 1110. The note was issued to the bank to prevent default on prior loans,
and was collateralized by a deed of trust on real estate. Id. Prior liens on the real estate
rendered the collateralized deed subordinate to those claims. Id.
61. In determining the note was not a security, the district court based its decision
exclusively on the note's six-month maturity length. Id. at 1111.
62. Id. at 1113. The court went on to note the bank merely intended to aid in the
operation of the livestock business, and that the case lacked evidence indicating the bank
intended to profit from the successful operation of the business. Id. This conclusion is
suspect, however, as the deed used to collaterize the note was subordinate to other claims.
While the record does not show the extent of these prior claims, the bank's ability to
collect the total amount of the loan upon foreclosure could have been limited. Therefore
the bank possibly had an interest in the successful operation of the business. The outcome

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
1982]

DEFINING NOTES AS SECURITIES

Shortly after Bellah, in McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock," the
Fifth Circuit developed criteria to aid in defining investment. The note involved was issued-to secure a loan from the defendant bank to a corporation
in which the plaintiff held half of the stock.- When the corporation defaulted,
the bank foreclosed on the corporation's holdings rendering the stock worthless.6 1 Refusing to find the note a security, the court listed three possible
criteria for finding an investment note:66 the note must be offered to a class of
investors; be acquired for speculation of investment; or be given in exchange
for direct or indirect investment assets. 67 Unfortunately, these guidelines provide little help in defining investment, for that term is incorporated in the
definition itself.68
Two factors are dear from the Fifth Circuit's formulation of the commercial/investment dichotomy. First, the test presumes the securities acts do

likely resulted from a- reluctance "to render federal judges the guardians of all beguiled
makers or payees." Id. at 1114.
63. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
64. Id. at 491-92. An underlying current of animosity between ex.spouses adds intrigue
to the interesting facts of this case. The plaintiff and her ex-husband each received half of
a corporation's stock in a property settlement. Under the impression that funds were needed
for corporate operations, the plaintiff consented to a loan which her ex-husband then
diverted to satisfy his personal debts. When the one-year note the corporation gave went
unpaid, the bank granted an extension upon the pledge of the plaintiff's stock for security.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that this pledge of stock was a sale of securities
within tie meaning of the securities acts. Although in some cases a pledge may constitute
a sale, in the instant situation the bank neither foreclosed nor sold the pledged stock. Id. at
495-96. Cf. Rubin v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 698 (1981) (pledge of stock constitutes sale
under Securities Act).
65. 497 F.2d at 492. The plaintiff brought the action derivatively on the corporation's
behalf, as well as individually. While apparently placing no importance on corporate involvement in the transaction, the bank's position in the loan particularly influenced the
court. As the decision stated: "A commercial bank's business is lending money not trading
in securities." Id. at 495. But cf. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 87.2, 878 (5th Cir. 1970) (preinvestment/commercial decision intimating that derivative action on corporate note available where individual action unavailable).
66. 497 F.2d at 494. In a footnote, the opinion stressed the factors considered in this
situation were not exclusive. Each case should instead be determined from the complete
context of each transaction. Id. at 493 n.2 (citing Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689,
696 n.15 (3d Cir. 1973)).
67. 497 F.2d at 493-94.
68. While the definition of investment remains unclear, commentators have suggested
that the Fifth Circuit's formulation contemplates an anticipated return dependent upon the
note issuer's business success. See Hammett, supra note 21, at 50; Sonnenshein, supra note 25,
at 1590. The subsequent decision of SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1974), supports this conclusion. In Continental, notes a failing corporation issued
to partially reimburse customers were considered securities. The court observed the customers
received the notes with hope of resuscitating the corporation and thereby realizing a greater
return on their investments. Once the notes were considered rejuvenating in nature, a
conclusion that they were also investment securities was inescapable. Id. at 527. Although
Continental did not involve a bank, the determinative distinction between this case and
McClure was that the return on the notes depended upon the issuer's business success. See
supra note 62.
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not cover note transactions unless investment propensities can be shown. 9
Federal subject matter jurisdiction will thus not be found unless the party
asserting securities coverage demonstrates the note is for investment purposes.70
Further, the involvement of a corporation in the note transaction has no sig-

nificance in the determination of investment characteristics. As the McClure
decision illustrates, the fact that a note is executed in furtherance of corporate
activities provides no due to the transaction's character. 7'
The Seventh Circuit's version of the investment/commercial dichotomy
employs a motivational test. As announced in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,72
the determinative factor in defining the economic realities of a note transaction is the note purchaser's motivation.73 The plaintiff in Sanders alleged
fraud in violation of the Exchange Act in connection with, the purchase
of short-term notes the defendant sold.7 The court found the notes were
securities and observed that the note purchaser's desire to invest his money
69. The Fifth Circuit has recently reaffirmed this position, while at the same time
recognizing investment/commercial distinction's conceptual ambiguity. See Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 428-29 (5th Cir.) (no need in present case to develop conclusive
explanation of investment, as real estate purchase money notes are obviously commercial in
nature and not securities), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
70. The question usually arises in the context of a defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Although the evidentiary burden for establishing
jurisdiction is not great, the onus is clearly on the plaintiff to show the note's investment
characteristics. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 429 (5th Cir.) (standard is whether
plaintiff's claims on notes are so immaterial and insubstantial that they can be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); National Bank
of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff
bank did not establish jurisdiction).
71. See McClure, 497 F.2d at 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
Compare First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp. of the South, 467 ,F. Supp. 943,
950 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (note corporation issued for financing construction project was security),
aff'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981), with Sea Pines of Va., Inc. v. P.L.D.
Ctd., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 708, 711 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (note issued by corporation for purchase
of interest in real estate limited partnership was not security). For a profitable comparison
concerning individual business loans, see Strain v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 68 F.R.D. 697,
701 (E.D. La. 1975).
72. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
73. Id. Although the motivational test has been described as an impetus approach, the
different terminology is merely a matter of semantics. See Sonnenschein, supra note 25, at
1593. These synonyms accurately demonstrate the focus of the Seventh Circuit's economic
realities approach should not be confused with intent. The motivational test implicitly requires that the desire to invest money prompt the note purchaser to initiate the transaction.
In contrast, an intent to invest would require no action on the part of the note purchaser
to facilitate the transaction. See BLAcI's LAw DiarrONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) (motive
prompts one to act; intent is only the state of mind with which the act is done). While
the distinction may seem inconsequential, proper comprehension of the distinction is
necessary to understand the test's application to varying factual circumstances.
74. 463 F.2d at 1076. A corporation issued promissory notes with a maturity length of
less than nine months through a securities broker. Id. Notes of this type are commonly called
commercial paper. See infra notes 112-140 and accompanying text. This phraseology can be
confusing, however, because commercial paper can often be investment in character. The
motivational approach to classifying such notes as securities will therefore be discussed in
terms of short-term notes.
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prompted the transaction. Conversely, in the nonsecurity note situation, the
78
note issuer desires to borrow money
The Seventh Circuit further clarified its motivational approach in C.N.S.
Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.78 In that case, the plaintiffs
sought rescission of an agreement to buy a small business from the defendants.
Fraud in conjunction with notes given to the defendants for part of thq
purchase price was the basis for. alleged Exchange Act violations.77 The
appellate court refused to find jurisdiction, noting that the impetus for
execution of the notes resulted from the plaintiffs' desire to finance a business
purchase.78 Such transactions were distinguished from situations in which the
person with the money impels the transfer. Because the transaction was not
motivated by a desire to invest capital, the note was purely commercial and
not a security.79
The motivational approach differs from the commercial/investment test in
that it analyzes a note transaction's investment characteristics in terms of the
note purchaser's actions. In other respects, the tests are quite similar. For
example, the C.NS. decision attached no significance to the fact that the issuer
and the payee of the notes were corporations 0 Similarly, both tests place
the burden of showing investment character on the party asserting the securities claim.81
75. Id. at 1080. The fact that note purchase arrangements might also have been investment contracts, which are included in the definitions of a security in the securities acts,
also influenced the court. Id.
76. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 US. 825 (1975).
77. Id. at 1345-55. The transaction involved the sale of a small coin-operated laundry
between two corporations. Three notes were involved in the transaction: (1) a note
secured by a chattel mortgage to a bank and used to secure a loan, (2) a note on the
corporation's fixtures given upon assumption of the seller's chattel mortgage, and (3) a
third note given as a cash substitute used as an earnest money deposit. When the laundry's
monthly revenues proved substantially lower than the seller corporation had represented,
the buyer corporation premised federal jurisdiction on the three notes it had issued in the
purchase transaction. Id.
78. Id. at 1362-63. The court specifically noted the plaintiff made no showing the banks
solicited it to become involved in an investment. No factors were raised to indicate the
banks or the defendant corporation were also involved in the operation of the business.
Rather, the transaction appeared to be an ordinary commercial loan. Id. at 1363.
79. Id. at 1363. As a matter of interest to litigators, the C.N.S. court reproached plaintiff's
counsel for failure to attach copies of the notes to the complaint. The court noted that
such a procedure would have been "prudent," inasmuch as jurisdiction was based, on those
instruments. Id. 1362.
80. Id. See also Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 88, 41 (7th Cir. 1976) (note
given by corporation as partial payment for purchase of second corporation's assets not
security); Lincoln Natl Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (notes
issued to Bank not security), aff'd sub nom., Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herver, 604 F.2d 1038,
1039 (7th Cir. 1979) (adopting district court opinion); Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 879
F. Supp. 250, 255 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (short-term notes issued to Bank not securities). But ef.
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 61-1, 612 (7th Cir.) (agreement to incorporate business
and transfer assets in exchange for cash and notes involves securities), revtd on other grounds,
417 U.S. 506 (1973).
81. See Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 41 (7th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's
jurisdictional premise based on commercial notes insufficient); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v.
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Risk CapitalAnalysis - Presumption
Against Coverage of Notes
2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and many western state courts,
have adopted a risk capital approach for determining whether note transactions are securities5s This method of judging economic realities focuses on
the relationship between the lender and the borrower.8 4 The term "risk capital
test" can be misleading. Classification of the loaned funds as risk capital is
merely an indication of whether the relationship of the parties is sufficient to
designate the note a secmity.- The key factor is the relationship of the
parties.88 One party must seek a return on risk capitals? from the other's
managerial efforts.88 When this relationship is present, the loaned funds are
termed risk capital and the note is considered a security.

G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1363 (7th Cir.) (complaint silent as to factors
conferring federal jurisdiction from an investment note), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971);
Oregon ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971). For an
additional discussion of western states which follow a risk capital approach to defining
securities under state law, see Hunt, Madame El Khadem, the Ninth Circuit, and the Risk
Capital Approach, 57 OR. L. Riw. 3, 7-10 (1977). See also Union Planters Nat'l Bank of
Memphis v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1181-83 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 97,2 (1981) (adopting risk capital approach to determine securities
status of loan participation agreements between banks).
83. See El Khadem v. Equity Services Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1249 (9th Cir.) (adopting
risk capital approach to determine that transaction involved securities), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974).
84. The California decision of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811,
361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), is usually seen as the origin of the risk capital
test. Sobieski involved memberships purchased in a golf club, which gave no rights to
assets or income, but allowed lifetime use of all facilities. The membership contracts were
sold in order to finance the club's further development. In holding the membership
contracts to be securities, the court noted that profit to the supplier of the capital is not
the test for a security. Rather, the objective is to afford those who risk their capital a
fair chance to realize their objective, whether or not that objective is a return on the
capital. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
85. See Sonnenshein, supra note.25, at 1596.
86. See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (to determine investment, analyze the nature and degree of risk accompanying the
transaction to the note payee).
87. Jurisdictions employing a risk capital approach generally distinguish between risk
capital and a "risky loan." Risk capital signals a transaction in which an investor risks funds
at the hands of another in anticipation of a return. In contrast, a risky loan is a commercial
transaction in which a lender loans funds under circumstances where repayment is questionable. The purpose of the distinction is to prevent a nonsecurity transaction from being
converted into a security transaction by the mere fact that the lender made an unwise
loan. Rather, securities status results from the investor relationship existing between the
parties at the time the note is executed and not from the issuer's subsequent insolvency. See
Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1965); Tri-County Bank v. Hertz, 418
F. Supp. 332, 343 (M.D. Pa. 1976). Cf. Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780,
789-90 (D. Or. 1979) (confusing risk capital and risky loan).
88. 532 F.2d at 1257. This formulation for defining a note security closely follows the
Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract security in Howey. See supra notes 42
& 52. In United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court clarified the
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In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,9 a corporation gave an -unsecured
promissory note to a bank in exchange for a line of credit. Securities coverage
depended upon a finding that the funding party invested risk capital and
essentially depended on the borrower's managerial efforts. 90 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the action's dismissal holding that the plaintiff had not met this
burden and that the note was therefore not a security. This determination
was based upon six factors: the time of the notes maturity, the extent of its
collateralization, the form of the obligation, the circumstances of its issuance,
the relationship between amount borrowed and size of the borrower's
business, and the expected use of the proceeds. 91 When all of these factors were
analyzed, the court found the bank enjoyed an extraordinary amount of
control over the corporation's use of the loan.9 2 This extensive control indicated that anticipated returns on the loaned funds would have been attributable to the lender's own efforts. The- necessary characteristic of a securities
transaction, a return on loaned funds from another's managerial efforts, was
93
conspicuously absent.
The Ninth Circuit readdressed the risk capital test in United California
Bank v. T.H.C. FinancialCorp.94 Although the defendant argued the plaintiff
Homey test by noting that the essential characteristic of a securities transaction is an
investment in a common venture while expecting profits derived from the managerial
efforts of another. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). The Forman Court then declined to apply
the risk capital test to define "an instrument commonly known as a 'security,'" in favor of
applying the clarified Howey test. Id. at 857 n.24. In so doing, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized a distinction between investment funds and risk capital which the Ninth Circuit
has failed to recognize. See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (citing Forman as authority for applying the risk capital test). While
not adopting a risk capital formulation, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of risk in determining whether a security is involved in the transaction. See Marine Bank

v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1224-25 (1982) ("The Court of Appeals failed to give appropri.
ate weight to the important fact that the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually
guaranteed payment in full, whereas the holder of an ordinary long term debt obligation
assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency.").
89. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 1257.
91. Id. at 1257-58. The court observed these factors were not all-inclusive, and no single
factor was determinative of the outcome of a risk capital analysis. For instance, time of
maturity is generally the most pervasive factor, as the longer the funds are loaned, the
greater the risk to the lender. Id. at 1258. In the instant situation, however, the other
considerations outweighed the relatively short duration of the ten month note. The
important concept to grasp is that these analytical factors all shed light on the lender's
ability to control the form of the transaction. The more control the lender possesses, the

less likely it is he contributed risk capital. Hence, the relationship does not signal an: investment that merits securities protection.
92. 532 F.2d at 1258. Great Western. involved a note given by a corporation to a bank
in exchange for over a million dollars worth of credit. While the note was unsecured, the

loan agreement placed stringent limitations on the corporation. The agreement stipulated
the loan could be used only for working capital, the corporation would keep a specified
minimum balance on deposit at the bank, and the borrower could engage no future unsecured loans. Id. at 1254-55.
93. Id. at 1259.
94. 557 F.2d 1-351 (9th Cir. 1977).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss3/3

16

Larimore: The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities Under the
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

['Vol. XXXIV

had violated the securities acts' disclosure provisions,95 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's directed verdict in the plaintiff's favor 8 because
the defendant failed to prove the notes involved risk capital. The decision
illustrates a presumption against securities coverage unless the party asserting the securities claim demonstrates the transaction has risk capital characteristics. 97 The court analyzed transaction in terms of the six risk capital indicators of Great Western and found no extenuating circumstances in the case.9s
The context of the transaction indicated nothing more than an ordinary commercial lending situation that should not be extended securities protection.9 9
In Great Western, United California, and subsequent decisions in the
Ninth Circuit, 00 corporate involvement has not been treated as a factor in
determining the existence of risk capital. Nonetheless, the risk capital test
contains sufficient breadth to allow the parties' corporate status to be considered in determining which notes are securities. 101 Corporate involvement
seems relevant in determining the form of the obligation, the circumstances of
the issuance, the relationship of borrowed funds to the business size, and the
contemplated use of the proceeds. Corporate involvement should therefore be
considered in determining whether a note transaction warrants securities protection.
Literal Approach - Presumptionof Coverage of Notes
Only the Second Circuit follows the literal approach to classification of
note transactions as securities. Markedly different from the tests previously
discussed, this method closely follows statutory language presuming all notes
to be securities. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkeley Photo, Inc.10° demonstrates the
95. Id. at 1354. A bank brought this diversity action against a finance company for
breach of contract. The contract was a "put letter agreement," whereby the finance company
agreed to purchase on demand all notes issued by a third party corporation to the bank
in exchange for a line of credit. The defendant finance company admitted nonperformance,
but defended on the ground that the bank violated the securities laws' fraud provisions by
failing to disclose the true financial condition of the corporation. Id. See also S. KAurmAN.
THE INvEsToR's LEAL GUIDE 98 (2d ed. 1979) (defining 'put' as an optional contract where
the holder can force the maker to buy a designated security within a specified time).
96. 557 F.2d at 1359.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1358.
99. Id. at 1358-59. In making its analysis, the court observed the financial arrangements
were basically short-term. The notes the corporation issued had a one-month maturity
length, and the put letter arrangement was limited to a six-month period. These factors
were insufficient to vitiate the general rule that the shorter the loaned funds are used, the
greater the likelihood risk capital is not involved. Additionally, the court noted the loan
proceeds were intended for use only in current obligations. This negated any implication
of long-term risk capital investment. Id.
100. See, e.g., United Sportsfishers v. Buffo, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978); Amfac Mortgage
Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carman,
577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978).
101. Cf. Cordas v. Specialty Restaurants, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 780, 789-90 (D. Or. 1979)
(amount of capitalization was factor to be considered in determining if loaned funds were
risk capital, although apparently confusing risk capital with risky loans).
102. 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curain).
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literal approach presumes the securities acts cover notes. The court, however,
offered no reasoning for its observation that the note transaction in question
was undoubtedly within the Exchange Act's purview 0 3 beyond noting that
almost all notes are held to be securities. 04
Justice Friendly's opinion in Exchange NationalBank of Chicagov. Touche
Ross & Co.:o 5 sets out the reasoning and application of the literal approach."a
Exchange dealt with unsecured, subordinated notes the plaintiff bank pur.
chased. 0 r Finding the notes to be securities, Justice Friendly observed the tests
sister circuits proffered required weighing of dubious factors.108 In an effort
to provide certainty, the following formulation of the literal test was announced: if a note is within the statutory definitions of a security on its face,
the party asserting that the note is not a security has the burden of showing
that the context requires noncoverage.' 0 9
This presumption of coverage gives strong deference to the statutory
language that defines all notes as securities. By providing examples of
contexts that require noncoverage, such as when short-term notes are secured
by a lien on a small business,1 0 the Exchange test also satisfies the require103. Id. at 663. The fact situation involved the sale of corporate assets in exchange for

two twenty-year notes in the amount of $5,250,000 each. Both the seller and buyer were
publicly held corporations. Id.
104. Id. at 664 (citing Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville,
409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969)). The Movielab decision reached the determination that the
notes were securities through a simplistic method of deductive logic. After observing the
statutory language includes some notes within its purview at the very least, the court
concluded these particular notes must be within the reach of the acts. 452 F.2d at 663.
105. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Recent Supreme Court decisions mandating an economic realities approach when
defining securities presumably limit the lower federal courts' ability to follow a strict literal
approach. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text. Significantly, in Forman the Court
reversed the Second Circuit and rejected at the outset a literal approach to statutory
construction of the securities laws. 421 U.S. at 848. As a result of the Forman intervention,
the Exchange decision was cognizant of a need to account for the economic realities of each
transaction. 544 F.2d at 1137. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), posed further difficulties for the Exchange court. In Zeller,
Justice Friendly had retreated somewhat from the literal approach in finding a demand
note a corporation issued to be a security. Although demand notes are not covered literally
under the securities laws, the Zeller opinion used an economic realities approach to determine the note's securities status. 476 F.2d at 800. The Exchange test can therefore be seen
as a softened literal approach which attempts to account for economic realities while
simultaneously minimizing the effects through greater recourse to statutory language. See infra
note 110 and accompanying text.
107. 544 F.2d at 1128. A corporation issued the notes in an aggregate amount of $1
million. Touche Ross & Co., the defendant accounting firm, had issued a financial condition
statement on the corporation upon which the bank relied in purchasing the notes. When
the corporation defaulted and the notes became worthless, the bank sought recovery from
the accounting firm for misleading statements made in the financial statement. Id.
108. Id. at 1137-38.
109. Id. The notes in the instant case fell within the literal scope of the securities acts
by having maturity lengths of twelve to eighteen months. Id. at 1138.
110. Id. at 1138. The Exchange opinion delineated various examples of when the context
would not require securities coverage. These included consumer financing notes, notes secured
by home mortgages, short-term notes secured by small business assets, notes evidencing a
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ment that the transaction's economic realities be considered. These concrete
examples, to be followed when adjudicating the context of a note, provide the
predictability that is absent in the investment/commercial and risk capital
tests.",
CORPORATE NoTE TRANSACTIONS AS
SECURITIES - PROBLEM AREAS

The Exchange test's virtues, reducing the ambiguity and increasing the
predictability of securities coverage, have important ramifications when considering the problem area of corporate note transactions. Definitional schemes
directed at defining note securities in general can prove problematic when
applied to corporate note transactions. Examination of corporate note transactions as securities provides a vantage point for formulating a superior
alternative test.
Commercial Paper
The securities laws contain exemptions for short-term notes. The Securities
Act exempts from registration notes with a maturity date of nine months or
less,112 and the Exchange Act excludes notes with similar maturity lengths.1 3
Excepting that of the Second Circuit, the tests the federal courts currently use
have essentially written these exemptions out of the federal securities laws.1" 4
By focusing on the character rather than the duration of note transactions,
the length of maturity no longer determines securities coverage." 65 This alteracharacter loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts
receivable, or notes formalizing an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of
business. The court observed: "When a note does not bear a strong family resemblance to
these examples and has a maturity exceeding nine months, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act should
generally be held to apply." Id.
Ill. Id. at 1138. For examples of how the literal approach has been applied in district
courts, see Banco Nacional De Costa Rica v. Bremar Holdings Corp., 492 F. Supp. 364, 368-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (notes issued by corporation to purchase assets of second corporation did not
resemble consumer financing notes and therefore were securities); SEC v. Garfinkle,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) [95,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (notes issued as
open-account debt, which were forced and outside the ordinary course of business, were
securities). But cf. Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (note given by
one corporation for purchase of subsidiary corporation resembled ordinary consumer financing
note and was not security).
112. Securities Act of 193, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976). See supra note 16.
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l0) (1976). See supra
note 16.
114. See supra notes 56-111 and accompanying text.
115. In McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), the court
noted:
The [Securities] Act covers all investment notes, no matter how short their maturity....
On the other hand, the Act does not cover any commercial notes, no matter how long
their maturity. . . . Thus, the investment or commercial nature of a note entirely
controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based
upon maturity-length.
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tion of the securities regulatory scheme affects the commercial paper market, a
market of particular significance to corporate operations.

Commercial paper is usually described as unsecured short-term promissory
notes" business institutions such as finance o manufacturing companies
issue."x7 The notes are payable to the issuee on a definite maturity date and
the borrowed funds are used to finance current business operations."8s Commercial paper provides the issuer a means of obtaining operating capital at
borrowing costs lower than those of bank loans." 9 The exemptions for commercial paper were included in the security acts to help issuers satisfy shortterm financing needs. 20 Additionally, the self-liquidating' 2' nature of shortterm paper supposedly protected investors: as the loaned funds were used to
finance short-term projects, the revenues from those projects provided funds
to pay off the paper as it matured.1"

Id. at 494-95 (emphasis in original).
116. Secured or unsecured refers to whether the obligation to repay the note has been
collateralized. If the note is secured, the note issuer has given a mortgage or lien, on other
property or assets, upon which the issuee can foreclose should the note be defaulted. Unsecured notes are usually considered to entail more risk to the lender than secured notes.
See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
117. FitzGibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the FinancialMarkets, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 893 n.175 (1980).
118. Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cm. L.
REv. 362, 363-64- (1972). Paper maturity lengths range from one day to nine months, with
the most common being less than ninety days. rd. at 364. Short notes are an advantage in
one sense for the lender, because they allow maturity lengths to be tailored to the issuer's
particular needs at the time of issuance. The short maturity lengths allow issuers to
quickly expand and contract outstanding debt as their need for funds changes. N. BAxTER,
THE CoMnmERcAL PAPrR MARKEr 60 (1966). On the other hand, the definite maturity date
can be a disadvantage to the paper issuer. Unlike bank loans, the borrower is not afforded
the option of paying off the debt early, should financial circumstances require it. Comment,
supra, at 365.
119. See N. BAXTER, supra note 118, at 64. In addition to the advantages previously
mentioned, the commercial paper market provides a forum for potential borrowers to
obtain huge amounts of funds that would not otherwise be available from banks. Perhaps
the most important function of commercial paper is that it keeps the borrowing firm in

contact with the financial community, should further financing needs arise. Id. at 11, 66.
120. See Federal Securities Act, 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking & Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1933) (Letter from Chester Morrill, Secretary
of Federal Reserve Board) (proposing amendment of Securities Act to exclude commercial
paper) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 875], reprinted in 2 LExsrAmVE HisroRy, supra
note 30, at 120; Federal Securities Act, 1933: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate d&Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 179-91 (1933) (testimony of
William C. Breed, representative of the Investment Bankers Assoc. of Am.) (commercial
paper exemptions should be included so as to not hinder paper issuers) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 4314], reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HIsroRy, supra note 30, at 179-81.
121. See Hearings on S. 875, supra note 120, at 94 (Letter from Lane, Roloson & Co.)
(commercial paper is self-liquidating and losses on such paper during the depression were
negligible), reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY, supra note 30, at 94; R. Fouutr,
Ta COMMERCIAL PAPER MAR;r 96, 154-56 (1931) (risk of loss from commercial paper is infinitesimal).
-122. For a dear explanation of how the commercial paper market is thought to operate,
see Arenson, Commercial Paper Surge, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1979, § 3 at 1, col. 3.
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In 1961, the SEC issued Securities Act Release No. 4412,123 an advisory
opinion purporting to delineate the proper scope of the short-term exemption
of the Securities Act. The Commission's opinion was based on its interpretations of legislative history. It urged that the exemptions should cover only
commercial paper meeting four high standards of creditability. 124 While the
SEC's construction of legislative history has been questioned, 125 modern
changes in the commercial paper market's structure lend support to this
126
narrowing of the scope of short-term note exemptions.
123.

SEC Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961), 1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

2045.
124. Id. In order for commercial paper to qualify for exemption under the Securities
Act, the release requires that it meet all four criteria. The paper must be (1) prime quality
negotiable paper, (2) issued to facilitate current operational business transactions, (3) discountable at a Federal Reserve Bank, and (4) not intended for marketing to the general
public. Id. Aside from the fact that the SEC based its interpretation of the exemption's scope
on legislative history, there are practical explanations for each of the criteria. The prime
quality requirement ensures that the paper issuer is financially strong. The problem is that
at present the SEC has not defined the term prime quality. In spite of this fact, it seems the
prime quality classification depends upon eligibility for discounting at Federal Reserve Banks
or high ratings from a commercial rating service. Gruson & Jackson, Security Issuance by
Foreign Banks and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 185, 191.
See also Hicks, Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3(a)(3) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 227, 242 n.54 (1976) (discussion of the commercial rating system and the methods for determining the financial strength of a paper
issuer). Eligibility for discounting by Federal Reserve Banks is also the third criterion in the
exemption scheme. Discounting is the method whereby a noninterest-bearing note is valued
prior to maturity. Id. at 236 n.42. The requirements for discounting eligibility are set out
in Federal Reserve Board Regulation A. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1981). These discounting requirements are quite similar to notions of current transactions, which insure that the
paper is self-liquidating in nature. For a discussion of the ramifications of the second criterion
of release 4412, the current transaction requirement, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying
text. The fourth criterion of nonpublic marketing is discussed later as well. See infra notes

127-33.
125. The major criticism has been that release 4412 exempts nonpublic commercial
paper. In developing this criteria, the SEC relied upon legislative history, which states that
the exemption is limited to transactions not to be marketed publicly. The release ignores
the fact that the exemption contained in the proposed statute at the time of the legislative
history, was applicable only if the paper was not publicly offered. The version of the
exemption Congress finally passed omitted this public offering language. See Comment, supra
note 118, at 883.
1,26. It should be noted that release 4412 deals only with the short-term note exemption
under the Securities Act. The short-term note exemption in the Exchange Act omits the
current transactions language of the Securities Act exemption. See supra notes 16 & 32. This
factor is probably of little consequence, because the current judicial approach of judging
the economic realities of each transaction abrogates the need to rely on strict interpretations
of statutory language. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 1972)
(using criteria of Release 4412 to determine if commercial paper was exempt security under
Exchange Act short-term exemption), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1973). Under the Second
Circuit's literal approach, the differences are more problematic. Strictly construed, any note
with a maturity time of under nine months would not be within the definition of a
security under the Exchange Act. The same note would be subject to the fraud provisions
of the Securities Act, if it did not meet the current transactions requirement. See Franklin
Say. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir. 1977) (dismissing the claim on the merits,
before reaching the question of the unclarity in the literal approach); Exchange Natl
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The character of commercial paper purchasers has been one important
alteration in the market. When the securities acts were passed, the typical
purchasers of commercial paper were banks seeking liquid short-term investments. 127 Modem investors, however, have increasingly turned to commercial
paper, and currently many holders are non-financial institutions. 12s The per-

ceived trustworthiness of commercial paper 29 and its yield,18 0 which is higher
than that of other money-market instruments,al' has prompted this new
diversity in commercial paper purchasers

82

As a result, the sophistication of

commercial paper purchasers is less than traditionally presumed.2 3

The second significant change in the commercial paper market concerns

the issuers. The nature of paper issuances changed as more corporations turned
Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1,138 n:19 (2d Cir. 1976) (leaving
undecided the status of a short-term note that would not be subject to the Exchange Act,
but would constitute a security under the Securities Act); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp.
1155, 1168 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (where note of less than nine-month maturity length involved,
defendant must show the context otherwise requires noncoverage under the Securities Act,
but plaintiff has the burden of establishing inclusion under the Exchange Act).
:127. R. FouLum, supra note 121, at 65. See also Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 120,
at 182 (Testimony of William C. Breed, representative of the Investment Bankers Assoc.
of Am.) (commercial paper is almost wholly a banking proposition), reprintedin 2 LEns.xrAiv
Husromt, supra note 30, at 182.
128. N. BAxTER, supra note 118, at 40. Nonfinancial institutions now account for approximately half of the dollar volume of commercial paper purchased. Id. See also Schweitzer,
Commercial Paper and the Securities Act of 1933: A Role for Registration, 63 GEo. L.J.
1245, 1250 (1975) (non-financial corporations are now the primary purchasers of commercial
paper).
129. See Comment, supranote 118, at 870.
150. Yield is the rate of return on an investment. S. KAUFMAN, supra note 95, at 101.
131. Comment, supra note -118, at 370-71. Money market instruments are alternative
means of short-term investment. They include Government securities, banker's acceptances
and negotiabletime certificates of deposit. Each possesses particular characteristics of yield,
default risk and marketability. An investor's choice of an investment instrument depends
upon the investor's individual needs. Many investors view commercial paper as having the
best combination of yield and minimal risk. N. BAXTER, supra note 118, at 370.
132. The non-financial institution purchasers commonly include industrial corporations,
public utilities, trust funds, public funds, charities, educational institutions and hospitals.
B. FiurzZrx, THE CoMraCAAL PAPER MARKET: 1965-1973 30 (1974) (unpublished thesis)
(available in University of Florida Library). In addition, private investors are becoming in.
creasingly involved in purchasing commercial paper. While the private purchaser is a
relatively small part of the market, paper dealers are attempting new methods of interesting
private investors in the market. See Comment, supra note 118, at 370.
133. Bank purchasers of commercial paper in the 1920's had a highly systematized procedure for checking the financial standing of the paper issuers. This information was
passed throughout the financial system so that prospective purchasers could make intelligent
decisions concerning the desirability of purchasing paper from particular issuers. R. FouLam,
supra note 121, at 65-67. In contrast, modern investors usually lack information about the
issuer. Purchasers often must choose from the paper currently available whose maturity
lengths fit the borrower's needs, and usually must rely on the dealer for information concerning the issuer. See Staff Report of the SEC to the Special Subcomm. on Investigations/the
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce: The Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Co.,
summarized in [1972-197a Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE,. (CCH) 78,931 (Aug. 1972);
Hicks, supra note 423, at 231 n.6.
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to the market to raise long-term capital in response to economic pressures.'s
Although commercial paper is short-term financing, there is often no relationship between a particular paper issuance and the transaction it was purported
to fund.15 The continuous rollover 3 6 of short-term notes to finance long-term
expenditures violates a fundamental principle that prohibits short-term financing of long-term projects. 37 When this premise is disregarded, the selfliquidating nature of the paper is destroyed and much of the protection
afforded investors is lost. 38
The inescapable conclusion is that the modem commercial paper market
differs from the market that originally prompted inclusion of short-term note
exemptions in the securities acts. The current market contains weaknesses
which merit securities regulation,139 and this factor must be taken into account
in formulating a definition of securities that protects investors. 14 0
134. Tight monetary policy in the late 1960's has been blamed for initiating this trend.
High long-term interest rates and limited bank credit availability encouraged many corporations to turn to the commercial paper market to raise long-term funds. This method of
financing has become increasingly popular in recent years. See B. F5UZZELL, supra note 132,
at 66-69.
135. Schweitzer, supra note 128, at 1248-49.
136. "To 'roll over' commercial paper is to re-issue it upon maturity." Gruson &
Jackson, supra note 124, at 191 n.37. The paper may contain provisions for automatic rollover, or the issuer may re-issue the paper to another buyer. Id.
137. See Comment, supra note 118, at 374. See also, N. BAXTER, supra note 118, at 75
(commercial paper is not a substitute for longer-term financing). The Penn Central debacle
is illustrative of this point. In 1970, when the corporation filed for reorganization under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, it had over $82 million of outstanding commercial paper which
it could neither roll-over nor pay off. See generally, Staff Report, supra note 133.
138. See Hicks, supra note 124, at 292; Schweitzer, supra note 128, at 1249; Comment,
supra note 118, at 388-89.
139. The SEC has recognized this fact through implementation of release 4412. The
Commission's method of handling the current transactions requirement, however, has
proved ineffectual. While the proceeds of exempted paper must be used for current
transactions, the Commission does not attempt to tie specific proceeds to specific transactions. Instead, a formula has been adopted whereby the issuer's total outstanding paper is
contrasted against the issuer's total amount of current transactions. If the current transactions do not exceed the paper transactions, new issuance of commercial paper will not
be challenged. See Gruson & Jackson, supra note 124, at 195. The result is that the shortterm exemptions have become a means of raising long-term capital that is not subject to
protection under the securities laws. See Hicks, supra note 124, at 292. See also SEC no-action
letter (Merrill Lynch & Co.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SE. L. RE'. (CCH) 1 80,851
(Dec. 9, 1976) (tracing proceeds to specific transactions not required if proper formula is used).
140. The major criticism of subjecting commercial paper to securities coverage is that
the registration provisions would cripple the market. See Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring registration of commercial paper would
wreak havoc on the market). If the purpose of the securities acts is to protect investors, forcing
low quality paper issuers out of the market may be desirable. Such drastic measures, however,
are probably not necessary. Commentators have suggested that the SEC implement a form
of "shelf" registration for low quality issuers. The procedure would entail continuous updating of previously disclosed information, rather than a new filing upon each issuance. See
Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued by Bank Holding Companies,
29 Bus. LAw. 207, 224-25 (1973); Hicks, supra note 124, at 298-99; Schweitzer, supra note 128,
at 1257-60. The SEC has scheduled hearings to consider the impact of a recently proposed
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Banking andFinanceInstitutions- The FraudProvisionsr1

Notes that banks and lending institutions 42 accept as security for loans
are often the subject of note securities litigation.- Because the volume of
potential litigation is great, most courts have been extremely reluctant to
afford securities protection to financial institution lenders.'" The crucial
inquiry is whether financial institutions should be treated differently than other
parties under the securities acts.
It has been suggested that notes given to financial institutions are per se
outside the federal securities laws' ambit. Various reasons are given for this

proposition. First, Judge Wright's concurrence in Great Western suggests notes
shelf registration rule on investor protection, on syndication and on the secondary securities
market. Securities Act Release No. 6391, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18561 (March
83,108 (hearings scheduled
12, 1982), [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCI)
for June 28, 1982). Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1980) (granting authority to SEC to promulgate
exemptions for issuances involving less than five million dollars, where registration is not
necessary for the protection of investors).
S141. The securities acts contain registration exemptions for transactions involving financial
institutions. Banks are exempted from registration under the Securities Act, and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board controls registration under the Exchange Act. Securities issued by
financial institutions are exempted from both acts as well. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(2), 77c(a)(5)(A) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of J934, 15 U.S.C. §§78c(b), 781(i)
(1976). The majority of notes issued to financial institutions would be exempt from registration through the nonpublic offering exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
142. While not exclusive, the generic term financial institutions should include savings
and loan associations, building and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations,
finance companies, mortgage companies, and insurance companies. See Securities Act of 1933,
§ 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5)(A) (1976) (registration exemption for savings and loan
associations, and other similar institutions).
143. The Glass-Steagall Act strictly governs the ability of national banks to become
involved in securities transactions. While banks have the power to carry out all transactions
incidental to ordinary banking activity, they are prohibited from dealing in investment
securities except upon the accounts of customers. Although notes are included in the Act's
definition of investment securities, obtaining, issuing and circulating notes are expressly
delineated as activities necessary for carrying out banking activities. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7)
(1976). Cf. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 101 S. Ct. 973,
981 (1981) (upholding ability of banks to act as investment advisors to close-end investment
companies as proper incident to normal banking activity); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp.,
401 U.S. 617, 643 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (purpose of Act to keep commercial
bank out of investment business, as pecuniary interest of bank in outcome of investment
opportunity would undermine public confidence in commercial banking). In addition,
national banks may purchase investment securities only in compliance with regulations the
Comptroller of the Currency sets. See 12 U.S.C. § 4(7) (1976). Despite this general policy of
divorcing banking activities from dealing in investment securities, the fact remains that
banks do become involved in securities transactions. See, e.g., Hector v. Weins, 533 F.2d 429,
431-32 (9th Cir. 1976) (notes given to bank in exchange for cash advances to operate livestock business); N.B.I. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Chemical Bank, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
Fan. Sac. L. REP (CCH) 1 95, 632 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1976) (loan participation agreement
between banks to sell notes of construction company); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp.
490, 491 (D. Utah 1973) (derivative action on behalf of defunct bank to collect on defaulted
notes).

144. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'I Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979); National Bank
of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
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banks receive in exchange for loans are strictly commercial and not of an investment nature. 145 Banks' superior ability to control the terms of loan agreements146 allegedly precludes the need for securities regulation. This position
emphasizes the securities acts were intended to protect only those investors
4
who lack the means to control the use of their investment1 7
A second contention is that Congress' subsequent enactment of the Truthin-Lending Act'- implies that notes given to banks are not subject to the
securities laws. 149 The Truth-in-Lending Act requires full disclosure in consumer transactions,"* but contains specific exemptions for "credit transactions ...for business or commercial purposes," and for "transactions in securities . . . registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.1 151 The
separate treatment accorded credit transactions and securities is said to signal
congressional recognition that notes given to financial institutions are not securities under the securities acts.
Such justifications for failing to provide financial institutions securities
protection are unconvincing. As Justice Friendly noted in Exchange,1 52 an
enhanced ability to require disclosure will not always prevent fraud. 53 Furthermore, the position Judge Wright advocated fails to recognize that in many
instances the note issuer brings the fraud action against the lending institution.154 To make the cause of action dependent upon which party initiates
145. 532 F.2d at 1260-61 (Wright, J., concurring)'.
146. Bank control over loan arrangements results primarily from the face-to-face nature
of the transaction. Id. at 1261-62. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (1981)
(recognizing the importance of one-to-one dealing between parties, while finding an agreement involving the pledge of a bank certificate of deposit to guarantee a loan not to be a
security). The ability of banks to verify information and to supervise the use of loan proceeds is seen as an impediment to deception. 532 F.2d at 1261-62. Cf. National Bank of
Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1978) (bank
forcing refinancing of debt of financially troubled borrower).
147. 532 F.2d at 1262.

148.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1976).

149. This position arises from the district court decision in McClure v. First Natl Bank
of Lubbock, 352 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 US. 930 (1975).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976). The Act defines consumer as follows:
The adjective "consumer," used with reference to a credit transaction, characterizes
the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is
a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the
transaction are primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
Id. § 1602(h). See also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973)
(the Act's purpose is to provide consumers with disclosure as to the facts surrounding credit
transactions).
151. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1603(1), (2) (1976).
152. 544 F.2d at 1137.
153. Id. This point seems particularly pertinent when multiple lending institutions are
involved in the transaction. See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d at 1038-39 (7th Cir.
1979); United California Bank v. THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d at 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1977);
Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d at 990 (5th Cir. 1969).
'154. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d at 491 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Natl Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d at 1110 (5th
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the action is untenable and contrary to the securities acts' aims of disclosure.s 5
Reliance upon Truth-in-Lending distinctions to claim noncoverage of
financial institutions is similarly unpersuasive. As varioum commentators 5 6
have noted, the distinction is not between securities and nonsecurities. In
reality, the distinction is between those securities that must be registered
and those that need not be.- 7 Viewed from this perspective, the exemption

for commercial credit transactions is consistent with a finding that some
commercial note transactions are securities.
Nevertheless, the Truth-in-Lending Act's provisions for consumer transactions do offer a means of ensuring financial institutions involved in commercial transactions are accorded more equitable protection. The economic
realities tests fail to distinguish between commercial and consumer notes.158
In order to avoid undue extension of the definition of securities, these approaches classify both types of notes as commercial and deny both securities
coverage.' 9 The more prudent course would be to distinguish between consumer and nonconsumer transactions. Other remedies adequately protect
consumer notes 60 but nonconsumer commercial notes merit securities protection."6 Under such an approach, financial institutions involved in nonCir. 1974). See also City Natl Bank of Fort Smith v. Vanderbloom, 422 F.2d at 22a (8th Cir.)
(defendant asserting defense of securities violations in plaintiff bank's action to collect on
notes), cert. denied, 399 US. 905 (1970).
155. 444 F.R2d at 1137.

156. See Hammett, supra note 21, at 73; Comment, Commercial Notes, supra note 29, at
500 n.86.
157. The confusion seems to arise from the district court's misquotation of the Truth-inLending Act in McClure. When noting that separate exemptions are present for commercial

and securities transactions, the opinion omitted the subsequent language which requires the
securities to be registered with the SEC. See McClure, 365 F. Supp. at 485 (" 'credit transactions . . . for business or commercial purposes' and 'transactions in securities' [are] tarp
different types of transactions") (emphasis in original).
158. As noted earlier, the economic realities tests focus on the investment character of the
transaction. Once the transaction is termed commercial, the tests make no further inquiry
into the transaction's nature. See supra notes 56-101 and accompanying text. The literal ap-

proach, while not explicitly recognizing the consumer distinction, incorporates many aspects
of the concept in the examples of transactions not requiring securities coverage. See supra
note 110.
159. See Hammett, sura note 21, at 75. See also McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock,
497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (a commercial bank's business is lending money
not trading in securities), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546,
551 (10th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (bank's business is making loans).
160. In addition to the Truth-in-Lending Act, forty-eight states have consumer protection acts. Uranga, Idaho and Oregon Consumer Protection Acts: Administrative Powers of
the Attorneys General, 13 WruAmrrEx L.J. 455, 455 (1977). See, e.g., Florida Deceptive &
Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1981); Texas Consumer Credit Code,
Tnx. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-10.01 to .08 (1949 & 1981 Supp.).
161. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d
1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1978) (note given to bank in exchange for $2.25 million loan to purchase
business was not security); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354,
1362 (7th Cir.) (notes given to bank in business acquisition not securities), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975). Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220, 1225 (1982) (extensive protection afforded to bank certificates of deposit under federal banking laws makes securities
protection of such instruments unnecessary). These transactions, while garnering no securities
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consumer transactions would receive securities law coverage similar to that
162
of other parties who seek relief in note transactions.
SEC Regulationand the Effects of
Uncertainty on Corporate Governance
The federal securities laws were not intended to be vehicles for regulation
of corporate governance. 163 That has been traditionally viewed as a matter of
state substantive law.164 Nevertheless, the SEC has become increasingly involved with corporate governance. 16 By asserting its power to promulgate
regulatory rules and supervise disclosure,'6 6 the Commission has significantly
altered the structure of many corporations. 67
coverage, would also be exempt from consumer protection under the Truth-in-Lending Act.
See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Cf. Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the
Truth-in-Lending Act, 1976 A.B. FOUND. REs. J. 565, 566 (1976) (coverage does not extend
to transactions not involving natural persons).
162. The fact that in many instances financial institutions are far more passive than recipients of loan requests supports this conclusion. In many instances, they actively initiate transactions. One such instance involves loan participation agreements, where a lead bank seeks to
engage other financial groups in the funding of a project. See generally Note, Bank Loan Participations: The Affirmative Duty to Disclose Under SEC Rule lob-5, 27 SYRAcUSE L. REy. 807
(1976). Securities claims may arise from the participation agreement itself, or the underlying
note from the borrower to the lead bank. Such agreements vary from traditional concepts
of consumer borrowing and would seem to merit securities coverage. See United Cal. Bank
v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1359 (9th Cir. 1977) (dicta) (intimating that notes involved
in loan participation agreements merit securities coverage); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central
Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1969) (loan participation agreement
a security). The recent trend under economic realities tests has been to deny coverage of
loan participation agreements. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commercial
Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1181-83 (6th Cir. 1981); American Fletcher
Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel, 635 F.2d 1247, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 1982 (1981); United Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam). An additional factor is the recent banking trend of soliciting prospective
borrowers. In an effort to capture part of the lending market lost to the commercial paper
market, banks have instituted "off-prime" loans to attract borrowers. Banks are actively
pursuing prospective borrowers with short-term loans at interest rates significantly below
prime. See Lohr, "Loans to Business Undercut Prime," N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1980, at D7,
col. 1; Arenson, supra note 122, at 5, col. 4.
163. For a discussion of past federal licensing and incorporation proposals, see 1 L. Loss,
S.cuamrrs REGULATION 107-11 (1961).
,164. See, e.g., California Gen. Corp. Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § § 100-95 (West 1973 & Supp.
1977); Florida Gen. Corp. Act, FLA STAT. § 607.001-.414 (1981); Virginia Stock Corp. Act, VA.
CODE § 13.1-1 to .1-134 (1978 &cSupp. 1981). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (except
where federal law specifically requires certain action by directors, state law governs internal
corporate affairs).
165. See Sommer, supra note 10, at 120-21.
166. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976 & 1980 Supp.) (SEC authority to exempt from
registration issuances not in excess of $5 million, where coverage not necessary in public
interest); id. § 77d(6) (SEC power to exempt from registration issuances up to $5 million, if
made to accredited investors); id. § 77a(a) (1976) (general authorization of SEC rule-making
and regulatory power); id. § 78j(b) (SEC power to promulgate rules and regulations as
necessary to protect investors).
167. See Seamons, The S.E.C. and Corporate Governance, 60 Ci. B.R. 262, 262 (March-
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The investment/risk tests'les ambiguity strengthens the Commission's ability
to broaden the reach of its interpretations and to control corporate governance. The time-constrained nature of securities transactions usually prohibits
challenges of SEC determinations.269 Corporations usually find compliance
with Commission recommendations more expedient than risking costly and
prolonged litigation, the outcome of which is uncertain' 7 0, Unable to deter-

mine whether a particular note transaction will be adjudged a security, 171
corporations are forced to bow to Commission directives of registration or
disclosure to avoid litigation.Y2 Although Commission views are given par.
ticular deference 73 they are not judidal determinations that can be taken as

April 1979). The Commission's major focus has been on the structure of corporate board of
directors, independent audit committees, adoption of codes of conduct for directors and
altering previously accepted business practices. Id. See also Corporate Governance: No Further
SEC Rulemaking -For Now, 13 Sc. REG. & TRANsFEx REP. No. 16, at 1 (Oct. 1, 1980) (delineating possible areas of future concern for SEC).
168. Courts employing economic realities tests have specifically observed the unpredictability of the tests. See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 427 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
169. See Sommer, supra note 10, at 139. This-conclusion seems particularly applicable in
the context of note transactions, including commercial paper. Notes are often issued out of
a need for funds, regardless of whether the notes are termed commercial or investment. Due
to the fact that issuers in need of funds are unable to anticipate judicial reaction to the
transaction, they would be likely to follow SEC recommendations. Cf. SEC no-action letter
(Walter Musa, Jr.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,973 (Dec. 29,
1976) (sale of development subdivision land parcels in exchange for notes requires registration under Securities Act); SEC no-action letter (First Wis. Corp.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. RE. (CCH) 80,666 (June 25, 1976) (SEC unable to conclude it would not
recommend enforcement action if short-term notes used to carry real estate interests are
offered or sold without registration).
170. See Sommer, supra note 10, at 139. While the securities status of a particular transaction may have an uncertain outcome, challenges of SEC regulatory power may have an
uncertain outcome as well. To date, the power of the SEC to promulgate rules and compel
disclosure has not been limited. Id. See also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
171. Uncertainty of application has important consequences for corporate counsel.
Attorneys must have some perception of the rules courts will apply, if they are to effectively
counsel clients should an alleged violation occur. See C.N.S., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Sonnenschein, supra note 25, at 1605. Cf. Uphohn Co. v.
United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 684 (1981) (declining to limit attorney-client privilege, noting
the importance of allowing counsel to gather information from all staff levels in order to
effectively counsel corporation).
172. See, e.g., SEC no-action letter (Noruma Sec. Int'l Inc.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FE. SFc. L. REP. (CCH) 180,864 (Oct. 8, 1976) (registration of foreign bills of exchange
would be required under Securities Act); SEC no-action letter (American Investment Co.)
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sc. L. REP. (CCM) 81,588 (March 24, 1978) (SEC will
recommend no-action on commercial paper issuance if amount of issuance does not exceed
outstanding sales contracts and secured loans>.
173. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (great weight given to Bureau of
Immigration's interpretation of Immigration Act); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 US.
617, 626 (1971) (deference to Comptroller of the Currency's reasonable construction of GlassSteagall Act); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1974) (SEC
releases are entitled to great weight, although not dispositive).
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definitive statements of current securities law.1 74 Consequently, the definitional
tests' ambiguity allows the SEC to regulate corporate note transactions without a clear judicial decision that the securities laws were meant to apply to
the contested transaction.
This result is not completely undesirable because it serves the securities
acts' disclosure objectives; 175 however, both practical and policy reasons
contradict this contention. From a policy perspective, the ramifications of
the Commission's disclosure policies go far beyond the dissemination of
information. Through use of action/no-action letters, 78 policy pronouncements, and settlements of litigation before judgment, the Commission has
been able to prod corporations to conform to its notions of proper corporate
governance. 177 The Commission commonly requires modification of governance
structure in situations where it believes that a restructured board might prevent future securities laws violations. 178 Such changes are achieved even though
it is unclear whether a court would find the contested action a securities vio79
lation or would approve the required restructuring.
From a practical standpoint, registration and disclosure requirements
under the securities laws are costly because information which falls outside
normal accounting procedures is required.8 0 Although disclosure may sound
174. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214-15 (1976) (rule-making power
granted to an administrative agency is not power to make law). The form of no-action letters
underscores the fact that SEC views are not judicial determinations. Typical letters state the
letter expresses only "the Division's position on enforcement action and does not purport
to express any legal conclusion on the question presented." Furthermore, the opinion is based
upon the facts as stated and might be changed should the situation change. See, e.g. SEC
no-action letter (A.G. Becker, Inc.) [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L REP. (CCH) %81,512
(Nov. 2, 1977); SEC no-action letter (San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,039 (Jan. 24, 1977).
175. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
176. No-action letters are published correspondences between Commission staff and
persons seeking official opinions as to the effects of the securities laws on a given transaction.
The Commission may merely give its interpretation of an applicable statute, or it may state
whether enforcement action would be recommended if the proposed transaction is executed.
See, e.g., SEC no-action letter (A.G. Becker, Inc.) [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Ssc. L. REP.
(CCH) T81,512 (Nov. 2, 1977) (staff will not recommend action if short-term paper is issued
in manner indicated); SEC no-action letter (Daniel E. Stoller; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) %80,704 (July 27, 1976) (concurring with proffered interpretation of short-term note exemption). The weight that
should be given to these opinions is uncertain. One commentator has suggested that these
interpretations are "law." See Hicks, supra note 124, at 233 n.27.
177. See Seamons, supra note ,167, at 262 passim.
178. See Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the
Director'sDuty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REv. 623, 640 (1981). See also supra note 167.
179. Sommer, supra note 10, at 129.
180. See Benston, supra note 4, at 33-34. Some examples of information the SEC requires
on disclosure forms include information on compensating balances, detailed asset schedules,
accumulated depreciation and expense amounts, and replacement costs of fixed assets. The
particular disclosure requirements are not as important as the fact that the data goes far
beyond what corporations would otherwise compile and disclose. Id. at cc. See also 17
C.F.R. § 210.4-09 (1981) (requiring financial statements to provide current replacement cost
information on inventories and productive capacity).
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innocuous, the cost of obtaining and distributing this data is substantial.18 '
For example, the Commission's historical insistence that disclosure statements contain no "soft" data01 2 has discouraged issuance of publicly placed
m
commercial paperas in favor of directly placed commercial paper.
The
ambiguity of the economic realities tests and the absence of a clear judicial
determination of what transactions are securities enhances the SEC's real
authority and causes unquestioning corporate compliance with SEC mandates.185 Corporations thus incur compliance costs and alter legitimate management decisions in response to SEC edicts that are based on uncertain

authority.'86
CoRPORATE NoTE TRANsAcTIoNs - INADEQUACY
oF PRESMET GUIDEINVES

While some courts have intimated corporate notes should be treated
differently than notes involving individuals, 1 7 the generic economic realities
181. Bellah v. First Nat'1 Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1,109, 1.114 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Registration is a costly procedure, both temporally and financially speaking.').
1182. Soft data is information based upon subjective valuation, rather than upon
historically based figures. This prohibition forbids the use of estimated values for certain
assets, such as patents, land, or natural resources, in published disclosures. Benston, supra note
4, at 40. See also Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1151, 1197-201 (1970) (detailing SEC opposition to projections and forecasted
eanings). Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-09 (1981) (requiring prospectus to provide both current replacement and historically based information on asset valuation.
183. There are two basic methods of issuing commercial paper. One is through direct
placement from the issuer to the investor. The second is to issue the paper to a commercial
paper dealer who sells it to the public. Each method has attributes which may be better suited
to the issuer's needs. Direct placers are usually continuous issuers whose constant borrowing
needs make it worthwhile to maintain a selling force and save the dealer commissions. Paper
issuers with sporadic borrowing needs predominantly use dealer placement. See N. BAxTER,
supra note 118, at 37-38; B. FszzaLL, supra note 132, at 20-26.
184. Benston, supra note 4. at 41. One of the requirements for a short-term exemption
from registration under release 4412 is that the paper be of a type not ordinarily sold to
the general public. See supra note 110. Other factors being equal, dealer-placed paper
would not be eligible for this exemption while directly placed paper would. Although the
amount of paper directly placed in recent years has greatly increased, SEC disclosure requirements are probably just one of a number of factors contributing to this trend. See N.
BAXTER, supra note 1,18, at 37-38.
185. See supra notes 59 & 166.
186. See, e.g., SEC no-action letter (American Inv. Co.) [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac.
L. REP. (CCH) 181,588 (March 24, 1978) (use of commercial paper proceeds to finance
consumer loans will not be challenged if amount of notes do not exceed outstanding loans);
SEC no-action letter (Merrill Lynch & Co.) [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RnP.
(CCH) 80,851 (Nov. 9, 1976) (expanded uses of commercial paper proceeds may not satisfy
current transactions requirement of short-term exemptions under proposed accounting procedure).
187. See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. .1971) (per
curiam) (notes given by one corporation to another are easily within securities laws); Rekant
v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 878 (5th Cir. "1970) (regardless of individual action, complaint
supports a derivative action). See also Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 696 n.16 (3d
Cir. 1973) (recognizing the corporate distinction, while not ruling on the issue).
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tests most courts currently use fail to accommodate this proposition.'M By
judging the economic realities of each individual transaction, the majority
position does not adequately consider a corporation's inherent character.
Corporations are state-created legal entities, formed for the convenience of
investors.1s 9 The corporate form, which separates the corporation from its
individual owners, is a legal fiction.190 Definitions of a security that fail to
account for corporate involvement in note transactions seem to perpetuate
the fiction of separate corporate and investor identity. If the securities acts'
central purpose is to protect investors, a test for defining securities should
recognize the interdependence of investor and corporate interests.
Other deficiencies are present in the currently used definitions of securities.
From a practical standpoint, the investment/risk tests fail to provide the
certainty necessary for effective corporate management. The absence of
predictable judicial tests for defining notes as securities requires adherence to
costly regulations.' 9' In contrast, the literal approach provides more certainty
through its strict adherence to maturity lengths and its presumed coverage
of notes within statutory definitions. Under such a test, there is a dear
judicial mandate that securities laws should apply to such transactions.
While the literal approach has advantages of certainty, it ignores weaknesses
in the commercial paper market that necessitate regulation. 92 The economic
realities tests some federal courts employ focus on the investment character
of the paper rather than its quality, and similarly fail to provide adequate
regulation. The Seventh Circuit adopted a partial solution to this problem
by recognizing that the short-term exemptions could be narrowed to high
quality paper meeting the standards of Release 4412. g9 By limiting the shortterm exemptions to such high quality paper, investors are protected against
economic weaknesses in the current commercial paper market.
CONCLUSION

The economic realities of corporate note transactions are such that they
merit separate consideration as securities. The most effective course would
be for courts to adopt a new test that explicitly recognizes corporate notes
must be scrutinized separately in determining the applicability of the securities acts. If it were presumed that the securities acts covered corporate notes,
188.

See supra notes 56-101 and accompanying text.

189.

See I S. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON CORPOL.TIONS § 2(2) (3d ed. 1927). Corporations

have traditionally been viewed as legal entities separate from their shareholders. The individual status of the corporation allows for separation of ownership and operation. In this
way the investment interests of stockholders are freely marketable, without causing harmful
disruptions in corporate operations with each sale of control. See 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 18-19 (1959); 1 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAw § 9 (1958).
190. See 1 G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 189, at § 12; 1 N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 10, pt. VI (1959). Cf. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976) (imposing liability on
persons who control others in violation of the fraud provisions).
191. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 126.
193. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
1982]

DEFINING NOTES AS SECURITIES

a clear definition of note security would be restored. Proof that the note is
high quality commercial paper or consumer in nature could rebut this presumed coverage.
The rebuttable presumption would give full credence to statutory language
and would provide certainty concerning the extent of securities coverage. Although the high quality commercial paper exemption is a somewhat ambiguous concept, the detailed criteria of Release 4412 provide a framework
suitable for further judicial clarification. 194 While the consumer note exemption
is more ambiguous, it is a classification with which courts are familiar and is
easier to apply than the economic realities tests currently in use.195 Some notes
involving financial institutions could thus be accorded securities regulation
without extending coverage to all such transactions. Corporations could also
ascertain whether they are complying with SEC disclosure regulations. The
clarity of the exemption criteria would provide predictability to judicial enforcement and would allow a corporation to evaluate whether its position
is strong enough to challenge SEC disclosure requirements in particular transactions. 96
In the context of noncorporate note transactions, over-inclusiveness of the
definition of securities, rather than its unpredictability poses the major
problem. A presumption of noncoverage, like the one the commercial/investment dichotomy employs, prevents overextension of securities protection. Such
an approach simultaneously provides flexibility to permit securities coverage
if the exigencies of the transaction require it. No matter which economic
realities test is used to define noncorporate note securities, corporate notes
should be examined as an identifiable class of transactions meriting separate
consideration under the securities acts.
The proposed test illustrates an alternative to the ambiguous definitional
approaches currently in use; it will not solve every problem associated with
defining note securities. A generic test broad enough to cover every conceivable note transaction, however, would lack the predictability necessary in
the corporate context. Nevertheless, the federal courts must adopt a method
of defining securities that accounts for the unique problems involved in
corporate note transactions.
ST-vm M. LAmioa
194. See supra notes 124 & 139.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62. See also American Express Co. v. Koerner,
101 S. Ct. 2281, 2286 (1981) (person jointly and severally liable with employer on "company
account" was not consumer); Henson v. Columbus Bank, 651 F.2d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 1981)
(notes given by individual to bank, although secured by home mortgage, were not consumer
in nature as, funds were used for corporate investment).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 168-74.
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